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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article reviews judicial developments in Texas environmental
law between October 1, 1994 and October 1, 1995. This Article
also reviews the new environmental legislation passed by the
Texas Legislature during this same survey period.
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II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the survey period, Texas appellate courts heard several envi-
ronmentally-related cases both under Texas environmental statutes and
common law. The first case reviewed involved the liability of corporate
officers and directors for environmental costs incurred by the State after
a corporation loses its corporate privileges. The courts also reviewed two
criminal convictions under environmental statutes. The two cases did not
focus on what constitutes or who may be liable for environmental crimes.
The courts in these cases focused more on general criminal law issues.
Nonetheless, the fact that two appellate decisions were handed down dur-
ing the survey period indicates, although not scientifically, that perhaps
criminal prosecution under Texas environmental laws is more likely now
than it was several years ago. The other cases reviewed in this Article
involved several other environmental issues. One addressed the scope of
the preemptive effect of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act on state common law claims involving products regulated under
this statute. Another case addressed the issue of the liability of a prop-
erty owner/waste generator for injuries to an independent contractor's
employee allegedly caused by the waste generated by the property owner.
Finally, a landowner's claims against a waste generator were rejected by a
court because the disposal of waste on the landowner's property was car-
ried out by an independent contractor.
A. LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS INCURRED AFTER A CORPORATION
LOSES ITS CORPORATE PRIVILEGES
Corporate officers and directors have faced potential personal liability
for corporate environmental liabilities under federal environmental stat-
utes for many years. Texas courts have also imposed liability for a com-
pany's failure to comply with Texas environmental statutes directly on
corporate officers and employees.' During this survey period, in Cain v.
State,2 the question of officer and director liability was an issue faced by
the Austin Court of Appeals. This case, however, focused on more nar-
row issues. The issue was the liability of corporate officers and directors
for a company's environmental liabilities for a company that had ceased
to exist. The court held that if the liability constituted a "debt" under the
Texas Tax Code and the debt arose after the action or inaction that
caused the loss of corporate privileges, then the corporate officers and
directors would be liable for that debt.3
1. See State v. Malone Serv. Co., 853 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ denied). See also Scott D. Deatherage et al., Environmental Law, 47 SMU L.
REv. 1131, 1136-37 (1994) (discussing Malone and its potential effect on corporate officers
and employees).
2. 882 S.W.2d 515 (Texas App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
3. Id. at 519-20.
[Vol. 49
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In Cain, the State sued Timber Creek Oil Company ("Timber Creek")
and two of its officers, Larry Cain ("Cain") and Larry McKay, for the
costs the Texas Railroad Commission ("Railroad Commission") incurred
to plug certain oil wells operated by Timber Creek. Before plugging the
wells, the Railroad Commission had ordered Timber Creek to plug the
wells. Timber Creek did not comply with this order. The Railroad Com-
mission authorized the expenditure to plug the wells on December 19,
1989. Subsequently, the annual franchise tax report for Timber Creek
was not filed. This report was due on March 15, 1989. Under operation
of Texas law, the corporate charter of the company was forfeited on June
23, 1989. Between July 1989 and December 1989, the Railroad Commis-
sion expended over $49,000 to plug the Timber Creek wells. The State
then filed suit against Timber Creek and the two officers to collect the
plugging expenses and the costs of bringing the cause of action. The State
brought suit under section 89.083 of the Texas Natural Resources Code.4
The opinion handed down by the Austin Court of Appeals upheld per-
sonal liability imposed by the trial court on Cain for Timber Creek's lia-
bility for well plugging costs. 5 The State based its theory of liability
against Cain on section 171.255(a) of the Texas Tax Code.6 Under this
provision, if the corporate privileges are forfeited for failure to file a re-
port or pay a tax or penalty, then the officers or directors may be liable
for the debts of the corporation.7 For the officers or directors to be per-
sonally liable, the debt must be created or incurred (1) after the date on
which the relevant report, tax, or penalty is due and (2) before the corpo-
rate privileges are revived.
The trial court, in a bench trial, held Cain liable for the plugging costs. 8
Cain appealed, asserting that the debt was incurred prior to March 15,
1989, when the franchise-tax report was due.9 On that basis, he claimed
that he was not personally liable for the plugging costs. 10
Cain argued that section 171.255(a) should be strictly construed be-
cause it is penal in nature. He further asserted that the debt was created
when the event that authorized the debt occured. 11 He argued that the
debt was created when the Railroad Commission issued its order to re-
quire well plugging by Timber Creek in December 1988.12
The Austin Court of Appeals was thus faced with the question of
whether the "debt" was "created" after the date the franchise report was
due. The first issue the court had to determine was the meaning of the
term "debt" under section 171.255(a) of the Texas Tax Code. To resolve
4. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.083 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1996).
5. 882 S.W.2d at 516.
6. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (Vernon 1992).
7. Id.







this question, the court looked to section 171.109 of the Tax Code,13
which addresses the definition for purposes of calculating corporate sur-
plus. The definition found in section 171.109 provides that the term debt
means "any legally enforceable obligation measured in a certain amount
of money which must be performed or paid within an ascertainable pe-
riod of time or on demand. '14 Cain argued this definition does not ap-
ply. 15 The court rejected Cain's argument and determined that the
definition under section 171.109 applied to section 171.255(a). 16
The determination of the meaning of the term debt for purposes of
section 171.255(a) was just the first step. The next issue was when the
debt was "created." A judicial device known as the "relation back doc-
trine" had to be addressed. In several prior cases, courts used this doc-
trine to avoid imposing direct liability on corporate officers and directors.
These cases also involved claims under section 171.255(a) of the Tax
Code or a predecessor statute. In these cases, in deciding whether corpo-
rate officers or directors were personally liable, the courts determined
that the liabilities were created after the corporation forfeited its corpo-
rate privileges. However, the courts concluded that the debt "related
back" to an event prior to forfeiture. Based upon this conclusion, the
corporate officer or director was not held liable by virtue of the relation-
back doctrine.' 7
The Austin Court of Appeals was critical of this approach. The court
stated that the relation-back doctrine originated in equity and was used to
effectuate justice while maintaining the appearance of equity. 18 The
court concluded that the prior decisions "have not engrafted upon section
171.255(a) an appendage holding that officers and directors are never
personally liable whenever it may appear that a post-forfeiture debt has
some connection to a pre-forfeiture event, cause, or circumstance."' 9 The
relation-back doctrine was generally used to maintain parties' lawful in-
tentions, preserve righti, and afford otherwise non-existent remedies.
20
The Austin Court of Appeals construed Curry and its progeny to main-
tain the status quo at the time contracts were entered. The party seeking
payment expected that the debt would be placed on a corporation with
limited liability.
The Austin Court of Appeals then refused to relate the debt of Timber
Creek for plugging costs back to a point before the forfeiture of Timber
13. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon 1992).
14. Id.
15. 882 S.W. 2d at 516 n.1.
16. Id.
17. The Austin Court of Appeals reviewed the decisions in Schwab v. Schlumberger
Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79 (1946), and Curry Auto Leasing, Inc. v.
Byrd, 683 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ). Several other cases were cited by
the Austin Court of Appeals as having followed the Curry case.





Creeks corporate privileges.21 It did not believe that any equitable basis
existed for doing so.22 The court cited a Texas Supreme Court decision in
concluding that the statutory provision allowing recovery of corporate
debts created after forfeiture of corporate privileges was designed "to
prevent wrongful acts of culpable officers and directors" and to protect
the public and those dealing with the corporation.2 3 The Austin Court of
Appeals believed imposing the debts on Cain served that purpose. The
court concluded Cain was responsible for the failure of the corporation to
plug the wells.2 4 The court did not believe Cain denied his "culpability"
but merely sought to avoid responsibility by arguing a particular statutory
construction. 25
The court then turned to the strict construction argument. Cain pro-
posed that this doctrine be used to determine that the debt was not cre-
ated after the corporate privileges were revoked.26 The court was
perplexed. It believed the strictest construction was that a debt only
arises when it is liquidated.2 7 Any other reading, according to the court,
would be expansive.2 8 It concluded, then, that the plugging costs became
liquidated when the Railroad Commission expended funds to plug the
wells, not when it approved the expenditure of those funds. 29 In other
words, the Railroad Commission could not have sought recovery until it
actually incurred the costs.
For corporate officers and directors, particularly of small corporations
that may be dissolved at some point, this case, if adopted more broadly,
could have important ramifications. This is particularly true because the
Austin Court of Appeals hears many, if not most, cases brought under
Texas environmental statutes. A corporate officer or director may face
potential liability for the debts allegedly arising for acts or omissions that
happened many years before but only become liquidated obligations
many years later. Events that lead to environmental liabilities often do
not result in environmental harm or such harm is not discovered for many
years or decades. For a variety of reasons, it is not unexpected that small
corporations will have ceased to exist during the time it takes for environ-
mental harms to manifest themselves. If the Austin Court of Appeals
position is widely applied in environmental cases, officers and directors
may be exposed to liability for the costs incurred today to remediate envi-
ronmental harms arising from a corporation's acts or omissions that oc-
curred decades before.
21. Id at 519.
22. Id. at 519-20.
23. 882 S.W.2d at 519-20 (citing Schwab, 145 Tex. at 383, 198 S.W.2d at 81.)
24. Id. at 520.
25. Id
26. Id. at 516.
27. Id. at 518.
28. 882 S.W.2d at 518-19.




In State v. Empak, Inc.30 the question of a corporation's right to a
speedy trial was the main issue before the Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals in Houston. The case involved three counts of misdemeanor
water pollution violations against Empak, Inc. ("Empak"). The district
court granted Empak's motion to dismiss the information based on viola-
tion of the speedy trial requirements of the federal and state constitu-
tions.31 The State appealed the dismissal.
The appeal raised two issues. First, the State contended that no speedy
trial right enured to the benefit of a corporation.3 2 Second, even if it did,
the State argued that the speedy trial right of Empak had not been
violated. 33
The first issue was the question of whether a corporation has a right to
a speedy trial under the federal and Texas constitutions. In this regard,
the court determined that corporations have the same speedy trial rights
as an individual.34 In construing this right, the court recognized that the
Texas courts look to the federal court decisions interpreting the federal
constitution in determining state constitutional rights.3 5 The State argued
that no speedy trial right applies to a corporation because this right is a
"personal right. ''36 The State's argument was founded on the fact that a
corporation cannot be imprisoned prior to trial.37
The court, however, pointed out that federal courts have applied this
right to corporations.38 The court believed that a delay in bringing the
matter to trial can have numerous serious adverse effects on corpora-
tions.3 9 These include being forced to live under a cloud of anxiety, suspi-
cion, and hostility; a draining of resources; subjection to public and
commercial obliquoy; restraint on liberty; and loss of contracts, custom-
ers, and public good will.40
In determining whether this right was violated, the court used the
Barker test created by the U.S. Supreme Court.41 The first issue was
whether the length of the delay was presumptively unreasonable. The
court concluded a delay exceeding 8 months meets the test.42 The second
prong of this test was the examination of the cause of the delay in bring-
ing the company to trial. The State offered no evidence and no justifica-
30. 889 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd).








39. Id. at 622.
40. Id. 889 S.W.2d at 622 (citing United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 677 F. Supp.
1042, 1046 (C.D. Cal., 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1989)).
41. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
42. 889 S.W.2d at 623-34.
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tion for the delay.43 At oral argument, the Assistant District Attorney
admitted that the case had simply "fallen through the cracks."" The
court concluded that when the delay arises through the government's
negligence and when presumed prejudice is uncontroverted, the court
should grant the defendant relief.4 5
The next question was timely assertion of the company's speedy trial
right. The government's position was dismissed out of hand. The court
pointed out that the company could not assert this right until it received
the summons.4 6
Finally, the court turned to the delay's prejudicial effect on the defend-
ant. The court concluded that Empak had presented some evidence of
delay and the State had failed to controvert that evidence.4 7 Thus, the
court ruled that potential prejudice had been demonstrated. 48 In so hold-
ing, the court identified three types of prejudice: (1) vexing pre-trial in-
carceration; (2) an accused's anxiety and concern while awaiting trial; and
(3) the possibility the defense will be impaired.4 9 The court concluded
that a corporation can be vexed by at least two of these issues.50 To be in
business, Empak needed to be in compliance with environmental laws
and regulations. Given the time between the issuance of the notices of
violation and the summons, Empak had not informed its clients of the
investigation. The summons would subject Empak to suspicion, public
and commercial disrepute, and the possible loss of customers and con-
tracts previously negotiated. 51
The court pointed out that potential, not actual, prejudice is all that
needs to be shown.52 Empak put on evidence that it had closed its files
with respect to the incident. The court concluded that the 29 to 42 month
delay between receiving the notices of violations and service and the 28
month delay between being charged and being served was presumptively
unreasonable.5 3 The State provided no justification for this delay and it
did not even attempt to rebut the presumption. Since the evidence of
some potential prejudice was uncontroverted by the State, the court up-
held dismissal of charges because of the violation of the speedy-trial
rights of Empak.54
State v. Dean,55 the second criminal environmental case handed down
during the review period, again focused more on criminal procedure than




47. 889 S.W.2d at 624-25.
48. Id. at 625.
49. Id. at 624.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 889 S.W.2d at 624-25.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id.
55. 895 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd).
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the nature of environmental crimes. In Dean two men were sentenced
after entering pleas of no contest to charges of unlawfully disposing of
hazardous waste without a permit and unlawful transportation for dispo-
sal of hazardous waste to an unpermitted location. The laws allegedly
violated were sections 361.221(a)(1) and (2) of the Texas Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act.5 6 Both men were convicted and sentenced to three years in
prison and a fine of $2,500. The defendants then filed a motion for
"shock probation." "Shock probation" arises under the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which allows the judge to suspend further execution
of the sentence and to place the defendant on probation under the terms
and conditions of the Criminal Code. 57 The judge may grant "shock pro-
bation" if the judge does not believe the defendant would benefit from
further incarceration. The trial court granted shock probation.58
The single issue of the State's appeal was that the Criminal Code re-
quired that the defendants have served at least some time in the State
prison system before shock probation could be granted.59 The Houston
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District held that the Criminal Code
in effect at the relevant time would allow imprisonment served in the
county jail to meet the prior incarceration requirement.60
C. SCOPE OF FIFRA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS
In Elam v. Quest Chemical Corporation,61 the question of the preemp-
tive effect of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") on state law claims based upon "inadequate labeling" or
"failure to warn." This case involved a woman's claims for damages
against a weed killer manufacturer for personal injuries allegedly result-
ing from exposure to the weed killer during her employment with the
City of Beaumont.62 The trial court had granted summary judgment in
favor of Quest Chemical Corporation ("Quest Chemical"). 63 The Beau-
mont Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment with respect to
negligence claims.64 However, the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the grant of summary judgment with respect to claims that the
weed killer was unreasonably dangerous for its intended purpose and
therefore defective and claims for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. 65 On application to the Texas Supreme Court for writ of
error, the Supreme Court reversed the Beaumont Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court concluded that all of the plaintiff's claims were founded
56. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANr. § 361.221(a)(1) & (2) (Vernon 1992).
57. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 6(a) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1996).
58. 895 S.W.2d at 815.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 816.
61. 884 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994).
62. Id. at 909.
63. Id. at 910.
64. Id. at 911.
65. Id. at 909 (citing and quoting Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Martinez, 501 U.S.
597 (1991); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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upon a failure to warn claim that inherently involved labelling issues. On
that basis, the supreme court ruled the plaintiff's claims were preempted
by FIFRA.66
The issue before the Beaumont Court of Appeals and subsequently the
Texas Supreme Court was the preemptive effect of 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v.
This section of FIFRA provides as follows:
(a) In General. A state may regulate the sale or use of any feder-
ally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the
extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by
this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that this provision of FIFRA only preempted labelling or packag-
ing requirements under state law that differed from federal standards.
67
Thus, the first issue for the Beaumont Court of Appeals was the question
of whether the improper labelling and failure to warn claims were pre-
empted by FIFRA. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
Court decisions, the court concluded that the claims were precluded by
the statute. The court also dismissed a related argument that the weed
killer was not properly registered with the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, because the Agency had given conditional approval based upon
instructions to change the proposed label.
Although unnecessary to reach its conclusion, the court held that an
individual who was an industrial hygienist and analytical chemical engi-
neer was not qualified to opine on the legal question of whether the label-
ling on the product was consistent with FIFRA requirements. 68 The
expert had no experience relevant to opining about compliance with
FIFRA requirements. The court also concluded that the bare assertion
without any basis in an affidavit that the labelling did not comport with
FIFRA requirements was insufficient to contest a motion for summary
judgment.69
The next issue was whether FIFRA preempted the claim that the prod-
uct was not reasonably safe for its intended use and was therefore defec-
tive. The court held that this claim did not involve labelling. In reaching
this result, the court thought it "inconceivable" that the Congress in-
tended that through FIFRA manufacturers of chemical products "should
carte blanche escape socio/economic accountability where evidence pre-
ponderates that said products are unreasonably dangerous or that implied
warranties have been violated." 70
66. Quest Chemical Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1995).
67. 884 S.W.2d at 911-12.
68. Id. at 910.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 911.
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The court also concluded that claims for breach of warranty were not
predicated on labelling and packaging deficiencies. 71 Thus, the trial
court's granting of summary judgment on this issue was reversed as well.
The defendant filed an application for writ of error to the Texas
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the detailed basis of the
plaintiff's claims that the chemical was defective and its breach of implied
warranty claims.72 After reviewing briefly federal court precedent on the
issue of FIFRA preemption of claims based upon labelling, the Texas
Supreme Court turned to the evidence of the basis of plaintiff's claims.
The court would have let stand causes of action for negligent testing,
manufacturing, and formulating, but it held Elam's strict liability and im-
plied warranty claims were based solely upon Quest's alleged failure to
provide adequate warnings and instructions on the chemical product. 73
In Elam's answers to interrogatories, she stated that the product was de-
fective because the defendant did not warn persons situated like plaintiff.
She also stated that the defendant failed to warn the user of the product,
therefore rendering it defective. In her brief filed with the court of ap-
peals, she claimed that the trial court's granting of the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment denied her the ability to submit to the jury
the adequacy of the warning on the product and her resulting damages. 74
The court reversed the judgment of the Beaumont court of Appeals,
without hearing oral argument, and rendered judgment that Elam take
nothing.
The result of the Elam case is that plaintiffs bringing claims for pesti-
cides or other products registered under FIFRA cannot base their claims
directly or indirectly on labelling requirements. To do so risks summary
judgment. For defendants, the best strategy may be to couch plaintiff's
claims as being based directly or indirectly upon labelling deficiencies.
D. PROPERTY OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES
In Hammack v. Conoco, Inc.75 the Houston Court of Appeals for the
First District reviewed a summary judgment granted to a landowner who
was sued by an employee of an independent contractor. The employee
alleged that he was injured from exposure to hydrogen sulfide gas gener-
ated from waste produced by the landowner and transported and dis-
posed of by the independent contractor. The ultimate question was what
duty, if any, was owed by the landowner to the employee of an independ-
ent contractor for the risks inherent in the work of the independent con-
tractor. The court concluded that summary judgment was proper because
a landowner does not owe any such duty to an independent contractor's
71. Elam, 884 S.W.2d at 911.
72. 898 S.W.2d at 819.
73. Id. at 820.
74. Id.




The facts of the case begin with the hiring by Conoco, Inc. ("Conoco")
of a company to haul produced water from several of its oil and gas pro-
duction operations. The employee injured, John Hammack ("Ham-
mack"), and another employee of the hauler picked up the produced
water and hauled it to a disposal facility. The two men then drove the
tanker truck back to the waste hauler's facility. There, the sludge in the
bottom of the tank was removed by using an acid wash consisting of hy-
drochloric acid and water. It was asserted that two persons, including the
operations managers, informed Hammack and his coworker not to climb
on top of the truck. Hammack asserted that, as the tank truck was being
drained after adding the acid wash, his coworker ordered him to climb up
on the truck to determine whether the tank was emptying properly. It
was undisputed that Hammack did in fact climb on top of the tank truck,
where he stuck his head inside the open hatch. Minutes later, he was
found lying on his back behind the truck. He was hospitalized and
treated for the injuries he sustained.
Hammack filed suit and claimed that he was injured by hydrogen sul-
fide gas present in the produced water hauled from Conoco's opera-
tions.77 The basis for the suit was that Conoco had failed to warn
Hammack and his employer about the dangers of the hydrogen sulfide
gas.78 Conoco succeeded in obtaining- a summary judgment. The sum-
mary judgment was granted because: (1) undisputed evidence showed
that Hammack was not exposed to hydrogen sulfide gas; (2) Conoco did
not owe a duty to warn Hammack of dangers arising on the premises of
the waste hauler and under the waste hauler's exclusive control; (3) Co-
noco warned Hammack's employer of the dangers of hydrogen sulfide
gas; and (4) Hammack himself was warned of the dangers of hydrogen
sulfide gas.79
On appeal the plaintiffs asserted two errors: (1) the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because Conoco failed to disprove any ele-
ment of the Hammack's claims as a matter of law; and (2) the summary
judgment evidence revealed genuine issues of material fact.80 The appel-
late court upheld the granting of summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
The basis was that the defendant had negated an element of the plaintiffs'
cause of action.81 Once a defendant offers evidence in its motion for
summary judgment negating a necessary element of the nonmovant's
cause of action, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to introduce evidence
that raises an issue of fact on that element.82
76. Id. at 131.
77. Id. at 129.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 902 S.W.2d at 129.
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. at 129-30.
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In reviewing the summary judgment, the appellate court first examined
the plaintiffs' cause of action. The cause of action was negligence. The
threshold question in such a case is whether the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff.8 3 This issue is a question of law.84 The court concluded no
duty was owed Hammack.85 The basis was that an owner or occupier of
land is not required to protect an independent contractor's employees
from hazards incidental to, or part of, the work the independent contrac-
tor is hired to perform.86 The duty to protect the employees of the in-
dependent contractor is that of the independent contractor alone. 87 The
undisputed evidence showed that Hammack was working for the waste
hauler, not Conoco, and that Conoco did not retain control over any part
of the waste hauler's work.88
In addition, any duty regarding hydrogen sulfide gas would have been
fulfilled. 89 Conoco informed the waste hauler of the dangers of hydrogen
sulfide gas with respect to the well in question. Conoco also required the
waste hauler to certify that all of its employees had been trained with
respect to hydrogen sulfide dangers. Conoco did not have any of its em-
ployees at the well site while Hammack and his coworker were there.
Hammack worked solely under the supervision of his coworker.
More importantly, the accident did not occur on Conoco property. It
occurred on the premises of the waste hauler. Although a land owner
owes the independent contractor and its employees a safe place to work,
according to the court, this is irrelevant to this case because of the loca-
tion of the accident.90 The court also rejected the argument that Conoco
exercised joint control over safety procedures for the wastehauler's work.
The court found no evidence to support this claim.91 Finally, the plaintiffs
asserted that the duty to warn arose because the work was inherently
dangerous. The appeals court rejected this argument as well. The duty,
in the court's view, arises only to third parties, not the independent con-
tractor or its employees, when a party engages an independent contractor
to perform inherently dangerous work.92
The case was even weaker because Hammack admitted in his deposi-
tion that he was aware of the risks of hydrogen sulfide gas. He also ad-
mitted that he looked for safety devices when he arrived at the Conoco
well and questioned his coworker about exposure to the gas at the well
site on the date of the accident.
The court concluded that the accident occurred at the waste hauler's
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id.
85. 902 S.W.2d at 131.









property, not Conoco property. 93 The danger was incidental to or inher-
ently a part of the independent contractor's work it was hired to per-
form.94 Thus, Conoco was not obliged to warn the employees of the
independent contractor about the danger.95 Having negated the duty to
warn element of the negligence cause of action, summary judgment was
deemed proper by the court of appeals.96
Hammack is important in the environmental context for several rea-
sons. Industrial and commercial entities engage waste haulers, environ-
mental consultants who investigate and oversee remediation of
contaminated properties, and remediation contractors to address envi-
ronmental concerns on their property. The question often arises as to
potential legal exposure to lawsuits by employees of those independent
contractors alleging personal injury from performing environmental serv-
ices. This case may provide helpful precedent for protecting those indi-
viduals or entities hiring environmental consultants and environmental
contractors.
E. COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR'S
DISPOSAL OF WASTE
In an interesting case involving the potential liability of a generator of
waste disposed of by an independent contractor, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals upheld summary judgment granted to a company who
purchased goods from a manufacturer and the manufacturer itself which
generated the waste. In Crow v. TRW, Inc.97 Ford Motor Company
("Ford") purchased seat belts from TRW, Inc. ("TRW"), which manufac-
tured the seat belts in Mexico. TRW contracted with Anglo Iron to re-
move and dispose of waste seat belt parts and materials from the TRW
plant. Anglo Iron reclaimed the metal parts and disposed of the non-
metal scrap material. However, on one occasion one of Anglo Iron's em-
ployees disposed of the materials on Arthur Crow's ("Crow") property.
Crow subsequently filed suit against Anglo Iron, TRW, and Ford. The
trial court granted summary judgment for Ford and TRW. Crow ap-
pealed. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals first examined the appeal
of the summary judgment granted to Ford. Crow alleged: (1) Ford was
negligent for failure to properly supervise the disposal of the scrap mater-
ials; (2) Ford failed to require TRW to hire a reputable scrap disposing
firm; and (3) Ford could not lawfully delegate its duty to properly dispose
of its waste and was therefore liable for any acts of TRW and Anglo
Iron.98 Crow also asserted claims of trespass, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligence per se under the Texas Litter Abate-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 902 S.W.2d at 131.
96. Id. at 131-32.
97. 893 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
98. Id. at 76.
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ment Act for disposing of litter in an unauthorized facility.99
In filing its motion for summary judgment on these claims, Ford argued
that it had no relationship with Crow and owed him no duty with regard
to TRW's scrap materials. 100 Although there were problems with Crow's
affidavit filed in response to Ford's motion for summary judgment, the
basis for the court's upholding the summary judgment was that the rela-
tionship between Ford and TRW was of manufacturer and purchaser. 101
Thus, the question was whether Ford owed Crow some duty to protect
him from the acts or omissions of TRW. The court ruled that in order for
such a duty to arise there must be some special relationship between Ford
and either TRW or Anglo Iron. 02 Since the evidence demonstrated that
no such relationship existed and Crow did not produce any evidence of a
special relationship, the court concluded that summary judgment was
proper for Ford.103
Turning to the issue of TRW's liability, the issues became somewhat
more complex. Crow asserted four causes of action against TRW: (1)
negligent hiring and supervision; (2) negligence per se; (3) trespass; and
(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 04 The court concluded
that TRW had failed to address the negligent hiring and supervision claim
in its motion for summary judgment and reversed the granting of sum-
mary judgment on that claim.105
With respect to the other claims, TRW asserted that Anglo Iron was
responsible for the disposal and that it was not liable because Anglo Iron
was an independent contractor.'0 6 The evidence presented through an
affidavit of a TRW employee showed: (1) TRW loses all control of and
authority over the scrap material once Anglo Iron picks up the material;
(2) TRW provides no instructions to Anglo Iron regarding managing or
disposing of scrap material; (3) the frequency of use of Anglo Iron de-
pends upon the amount of scrap generated; (4) delivery to Anglo Iron is
on a non-regular, need basis; (5) TRW pays Anglo on a job basis, not
weekly or monthly, and no deductions are made for Anglo Iron employ-
ees; and (6) TRW provides no fuel for Anglo Iron trucks used for the
disposal of scrap seat belt material. 10 7 The court refused to give weight to
the fact that TRW contacted Anglo Iron after the dumping of scrap mate-
rial on Crow's land and instructed Anglo Iron to remove it. The court
concluded this was insufficient to create an employee relationship as op-
posed to an independent contractor relationship. 10 8
99. Id. The Texas Litter Abatement Act is found at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 365.001-.034 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1996).
100. 893 S.W.2d at 77.





106. 893 S.W.2d at 78.




In reviewing the evidence before it, the court determined that the ques-
tion of whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor is a
question of law. 10 9 In reviewing the evidence provided by TRW, the
court concluded that the relationship between TRW and Anglo Iron was
one of an independent contractor." 0 Thus, the court overruled the points
of error raised by Crow with respect to the summary judgement granted
on the other claims brought by Crow.
Again, this case may provide helpful precedent to individuals and enti-
ties engaging environmental consultants and service companies-particu-
larly waste haulers. Even if liable under federal or state environmental
statues, the generator of waste may be able to avoid liability to third par-
ties. Waste haulers may not be liable for injuries to third parties allegedly
caused by independent waste haulers or disposers.
This case is interesting because the question arises as to how, if at all,
environmental statutes have changed common law theories of recovery
for environmental harm arising by virtue of the disposal of hazardous
waste or solid waste by independent contractors. Under certain relevant
environmental statutes, the generator generally remains liable for waste
for which it arranges for disposal or transportation for disposal."' The
Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA) imposes such liability." 2 The
Austin Court of Appeals in a case reviewed in last year's Environmental
Law Survey article determined that waste constitutes "property" under
the Texas Motor Carrier Act and the Texas Railroad Commission thus
had jurisdiction to govern its transportation. 113 One basis, albeit perhaps
dicta, was that one could not abandon property such as asbestos-contain-
ing material, because a continuing duty exists under the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act to ensure its proper disposal.14
In Crow, a careful analysis of statutory law was not carried out by the
court. The court only passingly discussed the Texas Litter Abatement
Act. This act, however, imposes criminal punishment on those who en-
gage in improper disposal or let it occur on their land. 1 5 This act would
not appear to impose any liability on the generator of the litter. On the
other hand, under certain circumstances, liability may be imposed on a
generator of solid waste under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act.116
But, absent in Crow was any discussion of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal
109. Id. at 78 (relying upon Sherard v. Smith, 778 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied)).
110. 893 S.W.2d at 79.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). This liability under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 or "Superfund" is com-
monly referred to as "generator liability."
112. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.271(3) (Vernon 1992) [hereinafter
TSWDA].
113. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Waste Management of Texas, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 835
(Tex. App.-Austin, n.w.h.); Scott D. Deatherage, Environmental Law, 48 SMU L. REV.
1206, 1206-10, 1223 (1995).
114. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 880 S.W.2d at 837.
115. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 365.012 (Vernon 1992).
116. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.271(3) (Vernon 1992).
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Act, which may have applied to the waste generated by TRW and dis-
posed by Anglo Iron. Perhaps plaintiff's counsel was not aware of or
simply did not raise the potential violation of the Texas Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act as a negligence per se claim.
The question ultimately may be whether in a relevant case the in-
dependent contractor status of the party actually improperly disposing of
the waste shields the generator. The fact that the generator may be liable
to the State under statutory law for environmental harm caused by the
waste it generates, may not be sufficient under common law to show that
the generator is negligent per se by virtue of the disposal or other man-
agement of the generator's waste by an independent contractor. First, the
TSWDA may not provide the basis for a relevant standard of care. If the
liability of a generator is properly construed as strict, it may not be rele-
vant to a negligence standard. Second, the question of what duty is owed
the third party still arises for the actions of an independent contractor.
Interesting legal issues in certain cases may arise as the interplay between
environmental statutes and common law claims continues to be deter-
mined by Texas courts.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The state legislature met in regular session during the survey period.
The following is a summary of the major environmental legislation en-
acted into law during this period. Unless otherwise noted, the effective
date of all statutes is September 1, 1995.
Environmental legislation passed by the state legislature in 1995 dif-
fered from bills considered by previous legislatures in one important way:
the most important bills focused on procedure. Although many bills
dealt with substantive issues, such as jurisdiction over spills on the Texas
coast, the underground storage tank reimbursement program, and
recodification of groundwater provisions, the most important changes in-
volved issues of procedure and rights. Befitting a legislative session dom-
inated by tort reform, the legislature showed a keen interest in the impact
of administrative proceedings on defendants in toxic-tort suits and fo-
cused much of its attention on how administrative and judicial procedures
affect the rights of respondents or defendants.
A. MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
1. The Audit Privilege Act
House Bill 2473 creates a self-evaluation privilege that protects volun-
tary environmental and occupational health and safety audits from dis-
covery and from admissibility in legal actions. 117 The widely-given
rationale for this bill is that companies often undertake audits to deter-
117. House Bill 2473 is codified at TEx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (Vernon Supp.
1996). The TNRCC issued a Guidance Document interpreting House Bill 2473 on July 24,
1995. The Audit Privilege Act became effective on may 23, 1995.
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mine their compliance with environmental requirements, but have
learned to avoid such audits because of the danger that agencies and third
parties will gain access to the audit results to use against the company.
Thus, House Bill 2473 was drafted to remove a disincentive from compa-
nies performing voluntary audits of their compliance with health and
safety regulations.
An audit report that meets the requirements of the act is privileged and
not admissible as evidence. 118 Such reports are also not subject to discov-
ery in a civil action, a criminal proceeding or an administrative proceed-
ing.'1 9 A person who conducted the audit may not be compelled to
testify regarding the audit. 120
The bill provides that a person who makes a voluntary disclosure of a
violation of an environmental or health and safety law is immune from an
administrative, civil, or criminal penalty for the violation disclosed.' 2 ' In
order to qualify to receive immunity, however, a facility conducting an
audit must give prior notice of the fact that it is planning to commence an
audit, disclose when the audit uncovers a violation, and attempt to bring
the facility into compliance.' 22
The audit privilege must be expressly waived. 23 Waiver does not in-
clude disclosure of audit information for the purpose of correcting viola-
tions found through the audit or disclosure subject to a confidentiality
agreement. 124
There are several exceptions and conditions. First, the audit privilege
act only applies to the requirements of Texas statutes and regulations, not
federal ones.125 In addition, to being privileged, the information must
have been derived through an audit. 26 Finally, the information cannot
be disclosed to outside parties, that is, to those who are not involved in
correcting the violations. 127
A court may require disclosure of audit information if it finds that the
privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose, that the material is not eli-
118. TEX. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 10.
122. Id. Jim Marston of the Environmental Defense Fund has suggested that there are
likely to be court challenges to the bill's language providing that a person who voluntarily
discloses a violation discovered as a result of an audit is immune from penalties if the
disclosure is made "promptly" and corrective action taken within a "reasonable" time. See
G. Hunter, Legislature's Handiwork Includes Many Legal Hairballs, TEXAS LAWYER, Dec.
18, 1995.
123. TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
124. Id.
125. The EPA has issued its own audit policy, statement entitled "Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations." 60 Fed. Reg.
66706 (1995). The EPA policy does not provide a privilege or a blanket indemnity against
agency enforcement. Id. at 66710. The EPA will, however, reduce civil penalties and not
make criminal referrals if the company performs an audit under the requirements of its
policy. Id. at 66706, 66707.




gible for the privilege, or that the material shows the owner/operator did
not take reasonable steps to correct noncompliance with environmental
or health and safety laws. 128
The law excludes information that is otherwise required by law to be
reported to regulatory agencies, information regulatory agencies collect
through their own inspection activities, and information obtained from a
source not involved with the preparation of the audit.129
Thus, House Bill 2473 offers strong protection from discovery of the
information compiled during a voluntary audit and from such information
being used against the company by a state regulatory agency, either in
administrative or court proceedings. It is essential, however, that a com-
pany comply with all the conditions of the Act or the audit will not be
privileged.
In order to gain the most protection for documents compiled during an
environmental audit, an audit should be undertaken under the attorney-
client privilege, in compliance with the conditions of both the State Audit
Privilege Act and the EPA's audit policy. To obtain the attorney-client
privilege, the audit should be requested by corporate or outside counsel
to form the basis of legal advice. Any outside environmental consultants
should be retained by counsel and all documents prepared by the consul-
tants should be directed to counsel.
2. The Voluntary Cleanup Bill
House Bill 2296, codified as Subchapter S, Chapter 361, of the Texas
Health and Safety Code, establishes incentives to clean contaminated
sites voluntarily by releasing future landowners and future lenders from
liability.' 30 Just as with the Audit Privilege Act, the underlying concern
motivating the passage of House Bill 2296 was the potential liability of
private parties.
One rationale for the bill has been that the fear of liability has en-
couraged companies to develop previously undeveloped land (green-
fields) outside of cities, while many contaminated sites within cities
(brownfields) remain abandoned or underutilitized. 131 Before now, land
that was contaminated by hazardous wastes could only be certified as
having been remediated in accordance with TNRCC and EPA standards
if it was cleaned in accordance with (1) a TNRCC enforcement order,
(2) federal or state Superfund (CERCLA) programs, or (3) the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA). Many companies prefer a volun-
tary cleanup program that protects them against penalties for past viola-
tions and releases future lenders and landowners from liability to the
state for future cleanups.
128. Id. § 7.
129. Id. § 8.
130. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.601-.613 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
131. See TEX. NAT. RES. CONS. COMM'N, 20 Tex. Reg. 9255 (1995) (to be codified at 30
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 333.1-.11).
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Under the Voluntary Cleanup Bill, parties may notify the TNRCC of
their intent to clean up a site under the existing TNRCC risk reduction
rules or other applicable cleanup standards. 132 After the successful com-
pletion of the cleanup, the TNRCC grants the parties a certificate of com-
pletion.133 This certificate releases future landowners and future lenders
from liability for the area covered by the certificate. 134 If a person who is
not a responsible party submits an application and completes the cleanup,
the certification can provide a release for that party as well.
The immunity from liability for future cleanups is a release from liabil-
ity to the state, not immunity from federal enforcement, but it is generally
believed that once one cleans up to state standards, it is unlikely that the
federal authorities will come after one for additional cleanups. 135 A po-
tentially responsible party is not eligible for release from liability for fu-
ture cleanups. 136
House Bill 2296 also provides that a landowner that is otherwise not a
responsible party that cleans up a contaminated property under the su-
pervision, review and approval of the TNRCC receives an enforcement
shield for the contamination or release and the activity that caused it.137
The enforcement shield means that the TNRCC will not seek fines or
penalties for past violations for the contamination that is the subject of
the voluntary cleanup agreements. An applicant must be accepted into
the program, come to an agreement with the TNRCC regarding the
cleanup and other issues, pay TNRCC for its oversight and clean up to
the standard of the risk-reduction rules or other applicable standards. 138
Another potential benefit of the legislation is that it allows one who
participates in voluntary cleanup to avoid the potentially higher transac-
tion costs that may arise in negotiating with the Agency and investigating
and cleaning up property under a TNRCC enforcement order.
3. The Takings Legislation
The Takings Legislation represents a major victory for the "Property-
Rights Movement." Senate Bill 14, codified as Chapter 2007 of the Gov-
ernment Code, gives private property owners the right to sue a govern-
mental entity for compensation if the government has, by ordinance or
rule, taken an action that constitutes a taking of private property. 139 A
taking is defined as governmental action that affects private or real prop-
erty in a manner that restricts or limits the owner's right to the property
that would otherwise exist in the absence of governmental action and
which is the producing cause of a reduction of at least 25% in the market
132. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.609 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 361.610.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.606(e) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
138. Id. § 361.603
139. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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value of the affected real property. 140
Whether a governmental action constitutes a taking is a question of
fact.' 41 Sovereign immunity is waived under the Act.142 If a private
property holder prevails in a suit, the governmental entity may either pay
the judgment or repeal the action.' 43 The property owner may recover
costs and attorney fees. 144
Moreover, a property owner also has a cause of action to invalidate a
governmental action when the government failed to conduct a required
takings impact assessment (whether or not the government action would
constitute a taking).145 The government's action is void if a required tak-
ings impact assessment was not performed. 146
There are various exemptions for actions that are not takings under the
Act.147 These include such things as some acts of municipalities, except
for actions that disproportionately affect areas within their extra-territo-
rial jurisdictions; actions taken to fulfill federal mandates; actions taken
to prevent public or private nuisance; actions necessary "to prevent a
grave or immediate threat to life or property;" formal exercises of emi-
nent domain powers; actions to prevent oil and gas pollution; many parks
and wildlife protection rules; and actions to regulate floodplain construc-
tion.148 Actions by counties are exempt until September 1, 1997.149
The Office of the Attorney General of Texas is responsible for prepar-
ing guidelines to assist government entities in identifying and evaluating
actions that would constitute a taking under the Act.150 The guidelines
for the Takings Impact Assessments that are required by the agencies
under the new law are due January 1, 1996.
A wide range of government actions, such as the construction of pris-
ons and powerplants could be construed as takings under the new law.
Thus, government contractors should evaluate proposed government ac-
tion themselves according to the requirements of Senate Bill 14 to deter-
mine if the proposed action would trigger a takings impact analysis.
Second, government contractors should negotiate to obtain a liquidated
damages provision in their contracts so that if an injunction is sought or if
a governmental act is declared void, the risk falls upon the governmental
body.
140. Id. § 2007.002 (5)(B).
141. Id. § 2007.023.
142. Id. § 2007.004.
143. Id. § 2007.024.
144. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.026 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
145. Id. § 2007.044(a).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 2007.003(b).
148. Id.
149. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
150. Id. § 2007.041(a).
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4. The Agreed Orders Bill
Senate Bill 1660, the Agreed Orders Bill, clarifies the TNRCC's au-
thority to include certain provisions in agreed orders settling enforcement
cases.15' The bill amends several subsections to the administrative pen-
alty sections of the Texas Water Quality Control Act, the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act, and the Texas Clean Air Act.152
The Agreed Orders bill evolved out of the concern that agreed orders
including detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, beyond merely
jurisdictional findings, encourage tort actions by private parties against
the respondent. 153 Because Texas recognizes a cause of action in negli-
gence per se, adverse findings and conclusions that one violated a statute
or regulations could be used by plaintiffs in tort litigation.
Under the new statute, agreed orders may include statements that:
(1) the order is not an admission of a violation of any statute or rule;
(2) the occurrence of a violation is in dispute; and
(3) the order is not intended to become part of a party or a facility's
compliance history.
In addition, the bill provides that an agreed order is generally not ad-
missible against a party to that order in a civil proceeding. 154 Finally,
Senate Bill 1660 provides that the TNRCC is not required to make find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law, other than an uncontested finding that
the commission has jurisdiction, in an agreed order compromising or set-
tling an alleged violation.
According to the TNRCC's draft interim guidance document on the
Agreed Orders bill issued September 1, 1995, the TNRCC plans to make
broad use of its provisions.155 The TNRCC anticipates that all of the
provisions offered by Senate Bill 1660 will be incorporated into the ma-
jority of enforcement cases (over 90% of enforcement cases).' 56 The re-
maining 10% will include cases that the Executive Director is preparing
for litigation, and thus feels that Senate Bill 1660 language should not be
available.' 57
151. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26 .136(p), (q) (Vernon Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.251(v), (w) (Vernon Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 361.252 (v), (s) (Vernon Supp. 1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 382.088(k)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
152. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 2 6. 1 3 6 (p), (q); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 361.251(v), (w), 361.252(v), (s), 382.088(k)(7).
153. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 2 6 .13 6 (p), (q); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 361.251(v), (w), 361.252(v), (s), 382.088(k)(7).
154. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(p), (q); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 361.251(v), (w), 361.252(v), (s), 382.088(k)(7).
155. At this writing, it is not known if the TNRCC will promulgate rules to implement
Senate Bill 1660 or if it will conclude that the guidance document is sufficient.
156. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(p), (q); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 361.251(v), (w), 361.252(v), (s), 382.088(k)(7).
157. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(p), (q); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 361.251(v), (w), 361.252(v), (s), 382.088(k)(7).
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B. OTHER PROCEDURAL CHANGES
The TNRCC is continuing to revise its procedural rules. On July 28,
1995, it published proposed rules to implement the requirements of sev-
eral bills passed during the legislative session and to consolidate the pro-
cedural rules for the agency.158 As Phase I of the TNRCC's rules revision
project, the rules were adopted in September 1995, with a sunset date of
May 31, 1996.159 Under Phase II, the TNRCC will review and revise the
Phase I rules.
Provisions of the following bills passed during the 1995 legislative ses-
sion are being implemented in the course of the rules revision project:
1. State Office of Administrative Hearings
Senate Bill 12 abolished the hearings division of the TNRCC and pro-
vided that hearings will be conducted by administrative law judges of the
State Office of Hearings Examiners. This law became effective on May
15, 1995. Amended Chapters 261, 263, 264 and 265 of 30 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE implement Senate Bill 12.160
2. Delegation of Uncontested Matters to the Executive Director
Senate Bill 741 allows the TNRCC to delegate certain uncontested
matters to the Executive Director. For example, the Executive Director
may issue a permit if the authorization is uncontested and notice of the
application has been approved. 161
3. Requirements for Standing
Senate Bill 1546 makes the requirements for legal standing in contested
cases more strict. The TNRCC was directed to adopt rules specifying the
factors that must be considered in determining whether a person or an
association is entitled to standing in contested case hearings.162
Under section 263.25 an affected person is one "who has a personal
justiciable interest related to a legal right, duty, privilege, power, or eco-
nomic interest affected by the application. An interest common to mem-
bers of the general public does not qualify as a personal justiciable
interest."'1 63 The section also lists factors that shall be considered in de-
termining if one is an affected person. 64
158. 20 Tex. Reg. 5601 (1995).
159. See TEX. NAT. RES. CONS. COMM'N, 20 Tex. Reg. 7290-7300 (1995) (codified at 30
TEX. ADMIN. CODE Chapters 261, 263, 264, and 265).
160. See TEX. NAT. RES. CONS. COMM'N, 20 Tex. Reg. 5015 (1995).
161. See TEX. NAT. RES. CONS. COMM'N, 20 Tex. Reg. 5020-5022 (1995) (to be codified
at 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 263.1 - 263.12 (July 11, 1995).
162. See id. at 20 Tex. Reg. 5022-23.
163. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 263.25 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
164. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 263.25.
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Section 263.27 provides that a group or association may request a con-
tested case hearing only if the group or association meets all of the fol-
lowing requirements:
(1) one or more members of the group or association would
otherwise have standing to request a hearing in their own right;
(2) the interests the group or association seeks to protect are ger-
mane to the organization's purpose; and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of the individual members in the case. 165
This section incorporates virtually verbatim the three-prong test for as-
sociational standing announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,166 and adopted by the
Texas Supreme Court in Texas Ass'n of Business v. Air Control Bd.167
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases reviewed that were handed down in the survey period pres-
ent interesting issues in several areas: corporate officer and director per-
sonal liability for the company's environmental violations; criminal
enforcement of environmental laws; and the interplay between environ-
mental statutes and common law claims of private parties. The Legisla-
tion enacted by the 1995 Legislature may have wide-reaching effects on
environmental enforcement and rulemaking. It may be years before the
complete impact of these legislative changes is fully appreciated.
165. See id. at 20 Tex. Reg. 5023.
166. 432 U.S. 333, 343, (1977).
167. 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex. 1993).
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